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• protecting the integrity of 
representative government, an aim 
which encompasses the prevention of 
corruption; 
• promoting fairness in politics, 
especially in elections; 
• supporting parties to discharge their 
functions; 
• respecting political freedoms, in 
particular freedom of political 
expression and freedom of political 
association.
Disclosure of contributions
The key principle underlying disclosure 
schemes is transparency of electoral 
financing. Such transparency is required 
to protect the integrity of representative 
government in three ways. It aids informed 
voting, thereby buttressing the integrity 
of electoral processes. Moreover, it is a 
crucial tool for preventing corruption. 
Further, such transparency is in itself 
necessary to protect public confidence 
in representative government. Besides 
these broader rationales, transparency of 
political funding is also necessary to ensure 
the effectiveness of specific regulatory 
measures. For instance, contribution 
limits can only work effectively if 
This article compares the Australian and New Zealand 
electoral finance regimes, with a particular focus on political 
contributions. Three specific areas are examined: disclosure 
of contributions; limits on contributions; and regulating 
the sale of access and influence. This examination is 
underpinned by what I see as the key purposes of democratic 
political finance regimes (Tham, 2010, ch.1):
accompanied by adequate disclosure of 
political contributions.
In Australia, a mix of federal, state and 
territory schemes governs the disclosure 
of political contributions. Here I will 
focus on the federal scheme, which is 
found in the Commonwealth Electoral 
Act 1918 (Cth). Under this Act, registered 
political parties and their ‘associated 
entities’1 are obliged to submit annual 
disclosure returns. Virtually identical 
disclosure requirements apply to each. 
The returns are required to be in a form 
approved by the Australian Electoral 
Commission (AEC) and must disclose 
the total amount received, paid or owed 
by, or on behalf of, the registered political 
party or associated entity for the financial 
year. In addition to disclosing these totals, 
registered political parties and associated 
entities are required to make further 
disclosure if they have received from, or 
owe, a particular person or organisation 
a sum exceeding an indexed threshold. 
In 2009–10 the indexed threshold stood 
at AUD$11,200 (or around NZ$13,250). 
In calculating whether this sum has been 
reached for payments made to the party 
(or associated entity), amounts below the 
indexed threshold can be disregarded. 
Consequently, cumulative donations that 
exceed the threshold can be disregarded 
unless one or more of these donations 
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exceed the threshold. Once the indexed 
threshold has been reached, however, 
registered political parties and associated 
entities must disclose certain particulars, 
namely the amount of the sum or debt 
and the name and address of the person 
(or organisation) who paid or is owed 
the sum. 
Persons who donate to a registered 
political party an amount exceeding the 
indexed threshold in any particular year 
are also subject to annual disclosure 
obligations in that they must lodge a 
statement disclosing all such gifts to the 
AEC and itemise those exceeding the 
indexed threshold; they are also obliged 
to itemise gifts exceeding the indexed 
threshold that were used to make the 
gifts to the political party. Further, third 
parties that have spent more than the 
indexed threshold in a financial year on 
political expenditure must disclose to the 
AEC details of gifts received exceeding 
the indexed threshold that were used for 
such spending. 
Candidates and groups of candidates 
are required, after every election, to 
provide to the AEC a statement disclosing 
details of gifts received during the period 
between elections if they exceeded the 
indexed threshold. Persons who have 
donated amounts exceeding the indexed 
threshold to candidates (and groups of 
candidates) must also disclose details of 
such gifts to the AEC after the relevant 
election.
This scheme is, as Graeme Orr 
characterised it, ‘lackadaisical’ (Orr, 
2007). First, there is the high disclosure 
threshold of AUD$11,200 (in New 
Zealand, the threshold is NZ$10,000). 
This has the effect of shrouding 
considerable portions of the parties’ 
income in secrecy. According to 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Library 
research, the previous disclosure 
threshold of $1,500 or more resulted 
in nearly three-quarters – 74.7% – of 
declared total receipts being itemised 
over the period spanning from the 1998–
99 financial year to the 2004–05 financial 
year. A threshold of $10,000 applied to 
the same data lowers this figure to 64.1% 
(Miskin and Barber, 2006). Updating 
the research of the Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Library, the Joint Standing 
Committee on Electoral Matters found 
that under the $10,300 threshold (which 
applied in 2006–07), only 52.6% of the 
income of the Australian Labor (ALP) 
and Coalition parties was itemised for 
that year (Joint Standing Committee 
on Electoral Matters, 2008, p.33) On 
these calculations, we have a remarkable 
situation where the source of nearly half 
of the income of the major parties is 
unknown. 
Second, there is the high threshold for 
anonymous contributions: AUD$11,200 
(in New Zealand, it is NZ$1,000). 
This is the result of the Electoral and 
Referendum Amendment (Electoral 
Integrity and Other Measures) Act 2006 
(Cth), which lifted the cap on allowable 
individual anonymous donations from 
$1,000 to $10,000 (and indexed this cap to 
inflation). Such a high threshold seriously 
risks compromising transparency. It is 
less about public disclosure of donations 
and loans and more about records kept 
by parties: it will mean that parties 
can legally accept larger sums without 
recording details of the donor. This 
potentially renders the whole notion of 
disclosure thresholds meaningless. 
A further limitation of the federal 
disclosure scheme is the lack of timeliness. 
The AEC has observed in relation to 
federal annual returns that ‘[t]his form 
of … reporting and release can result in 
delays that can discount the relevance 
of making the information public’ 
(Australian Electoral Commission, 2000, 
para 2.10). Specifically, the dated nature 
of the returns means that voters do not 
have access to the relevant information 
when determining their voting choices. 
For example, in late September 2004 
British Lord Michael Ashcroft donated $1 
million to the federal Liberal Party, barely 
a fortnight before the October 2004 
federal election. Citizens casting their 
votes in that election were completely 
unaware of this contribution and only 
found out more than 15 months later, on 
1 February 2005 when the AEC released 
the disclosure returns. Here, there is 
much to be said for the New Zealand 
requirement to disclose any donation 
exceeding NZ$20,000 within 10 working 
days of its receipt.2
Are there elements of the Australian 
federal disclosure scheme that might 
provide lessons for New Zealand? One 
area is perhaps worth mentioning. This 
concerns the disclosure obligations of 
third parties. All four principles of a 
democratic political finance regime are 
implicated here. Lack of transparency in 
relation to the funding of third parties 
(and their parallel campaigns) corrupts 
the electoral processes as it undermines 
informed voting decisions. There is 
also a question of fairness in politics, 
specifically fairness between political 
parties and third parties: subjecting 
political parties to disclosure obligations 
while leaving third parties exempt 
potentially provides the latter with an 
unfair advantage. This unfair advantage 
further risks undermining the ability 
of political parties to discharge their 
functions, in particular their electoral 
function of providing choice and 
competition to voters. The danger here 
is that political parties focus more on 
fending off the attacks of third parties 
than on competing amongst themselves. 
And, finally, the principle of respect 
for political freedoms clearly applies as 
disclosure obligations on third parties 
will mean greater regulation of political 
campaigning.
Presently, the federal scheme provides 
for greater transparency in relation to the 
financing of third parties by subjecting 
these groups to disclosure obligations, 
a measure that is not contained in the 
current New Zealand Electoral (Finance 
Lack of transparency 
in relation to the 
funding of third parties 
(and their parallel 
campaigns) corrupts the 
electoral processes as 
it undermines informed 
voting decisions. 
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Reform and Advance Voting) Amendment 
Bill. On the other hand, the Australian 
scheme does not require third parties 
which spend beyond a certain amount to 
register with the AEC, a measure that is 
in the bill. In my view, both registration 
and disclosure obligations should apply. 
Concerns about the impact on political 
freedoms can be addressed through 
properly tailored provisions.
limits on contributions
Here the position in Australia is very 
similar to New Zealand in that there 
are very few limits on contributions to 
candidates, their parties or other electoral 
actors. Indeed, there are fewer limits 
than in New Zealand. Whereas New 
Zealand bans foreign donations exceeding 
NZ$1,000,3 there is no such ban in 
Australia except in Queensland. The only 
other source restriction is a New South 
Wales ban on political donations from 
property developers. The only restriction 
as to the amount of political funding is 
that which applies under the Victoria’s 
Electoral Act. This legislation prohibits 
holders of casino and gambling licences 
and their related companies from making 
political donations exceeding $50,000 in a 
financial year to each registered political 
party.
In Australia, greater restrictions on 
political contributions have growing 
support across the political spectrum. 
Former New South Wales premier Morris 
Iemma has even advanced the radical 
proposal of completely banning political 
contributions in favour of a system of 
complete public funding. Following 
closely, his predecessor Bob Carr has 
advocated banning political contributions 
from organisations like trade unions 
and companies and allowing only those 
made by individuals. Former leader of the 
federal opposition Malcolm Turnbull and 
the New South Wales Greens have similar 
positions. Queensland premier Anna 
Bligh has also called for a national cap of 
political donations exceeding $1,000 and 
has signalled that Queensland will act to 
implement such a cap by July 2010 if there 
is no movement on the federal front. In 
a bipartisan report, the New South Wales 
Legislative Council Select Committee 
on Electoral and Political Party Funding 
(NSW Select Committee) recommended 
that there be a ban on all political 
donations except those by individuals. 
Contributions by individuals are further 
to be limited to $1,000 for each political 
party per annum (and $1,000 for each 
independent candidate per electoral cycle) 
(NSW Select Committee, 2008, p.105).
There are compelling arguments 
for a limit on contributions such as 
those recommended by the NSW Select 
Committee. Such limits will clearly act 
as a preventive measure in relation to 
corruption: as the amount of money 
contributed by an individual increases, 
so does the risk of corruption. Therefore, 
bans on large contributions can directly 
deter corruption (and also obviate the need 
for selective bans on property developers 
and holders of gambling licences). On a 
related point, such limits will promote 
fairness in politics as they prevent the 
wealthy from using their money to secure 
a disproportionate influence on the 
political process. The result is to promote 
the fair value of political freedoms 
despite limiting the formal freedom to 
contribute.4 Further, by requiring parties 
to secure the support of a large base of 
small contributors, such limits are likely 
to enhance their participatory function.
Significant objections to contribution 
limits do, however, need to be addressed 
(Ewing, 2007, pp.227-30). First and 
foremost, instituting such limits by 
themselves will leave the parties seriously 
underfunded given that the major 
Australian political parties are presently 
heavily reliant on large contributions. In the 
context of party government, jeopardising 
the existence of the parties must mean 
placing the system of government at 
risk. It is also unclear what impact the 
contribution limits will have on fairness 
amongst the parties. Further, contribution 
limits are likely to mean that parties will 
spend more time fundraising; they will 
need to persuade more individuals to part 
with their money, a development that is 
likely to detract from the performance of 
their democratic functions (apart from the 
participatory function). This will intensify 
especially if the ‘arms race’ between the 
major Australian parties continues.
These objections are, however, not 
insurmountable. It is, firstly, imperative 
that contribution limits be adopted as 
part of a broader package of reform. One 
of the central difficulties with the position 
of those who advocate contribution limits 
as the principal, or even the only, reform 
measure is that they do not fully deal with 
the potential adverse impact of such limits. 
To ameliorate such impact, there needs to 
be a reconfiguration of public funding 
of parties and candidates, including a 
significant increase in such funding to 
make up for the shortfall resulting from 
limits on contributions. Such funding 
should provide for sustainable parties, 
redress any inequities that arise from 
contribution limits and also lessen the risk 
of parties devoting an undue amount of 
time to fundraising. Further, contribution 
limits must be accompanied by election 
spending limits. The latter limits will 
staunch the demand that fuels the parties’ 
aggressive fundraising activities. 
A vexed issue concerns the impact 
of such limits on trade union affiliation 
fees. My view is that membership fees 
(within limits) should be exempted from 
any contribution limits. As the NSW 
Select Committee correctly recognised, 
‘membership of political parties is an 
important means for individuals to 
participate in the political process’ (NSW 
Select Committee, 2008, p.113). Specifically, 
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... contribution limits 
are likely to mean that 
parties will spend more 
time fundraising; they will 
need to persuade more 
individuals to part with 
their money, a development 
that is likely to detract from 
the performance of their 
democratic functions ...  
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it involves participation within political 
parties, thereby directly enhancing the 
participatory function of parties. Whilst 
contribution limits permit membership 
fees below the limits, an exemption 
goes beyond such permissiveness by 
encouraging party membership. Second, 
the exemption for membership fees should 
extend to organisational membership 
fees, including trade union affiliation fees. 
A ban on organisational membership fees 
will give rise to anomalies, is misdirected 
at ‘trade union bosses’ and constitutes an 
unjustified limitation on freedom of party 
association (Tham, 2010, ch.4). 
Dealing with the sale of access and influence
The sale of access and influence is 
endemic amongst the major Australian 
parties. Here are some examples. The 
Victorian ALP’s Progressive Business 
has been described as ‘one of the most 
efficient money-making operations 
in the country’ (Bachelard, 2007). Its 
website states that its ‘express purpose 
[is] building dialogue and understanding 
between the business community and 
government’. It currently offers to two 
types of membership, corporate and 
small business, priced at $1,550 and $990 
per annum respectively, entitling the 
company to a set number of breakfast and 
twilight ministerial briefings. The 2009 
annual Progressive Business dinner, for 
example, witnessed Latrobe Fertilisers, a 
company vigorously advocating the use of 
Gippsland coal mines for the production 
of fertiliser, paying $10,000 to the ALP 
so that its chairman, Allan Blood, could 
sit at the side of Victorian premier John 
Brumby and, in Blood’s words, ‘ben[d] his 
ear’(Millar and Austin, 2009). The Liberal 
Party has a fundraising organisation 
that goes by the name of the 500 Club. 
According to its website, membership of 
the 500 Club will provide ‘a tailored series 
of informal, more personally styled, early 
evening events’, thus ‘adding a new level of 
value for … Club members’. 
Party meetings are also a favoured 
venue for selling influence. At the 
2007 federal ALP conference, major 
companies, including NAB, Westpac 
and Telstra, engaged a high-price escort 
service: at $7,000 per person, their 
representatives were accompanied by 
federal ALP frontbenchers for the span of 
the conference. Tables at the conference 
dinner were also sold for up to $15,000 
for the privilege of sitting next to shadow 
ministers (Grattan and Murphy, 2007). 
At the 2007 Liberal Party federal council, 
federal ministers auctioned off their time 
to the tune of thousands of dollars: a 
harbour cruise with Tony Abbott, then 
health minister, fetched $10,000, while a 
night at the opera with Helen Coonan, 
then minister for communications, 
information technology and the arts, 
picked up a princely sum of $12,000. 
This activity took place under the council 
theme of ‘Doing what’s right for Australia’ 
(Schubert, 2007).
These practices are emphatic instances 
of what Michael Walzer characterises as a 
‘blocked exchange’, where money is used to 
buy political power (Walzer, 1983, p.100). 
They constitute a form of corruption. It 
is uncontroversial that public officials 
including elected officials are to act in 
the public interest. A central part of this 
duty is to decide matters on their merits. 
The purchase of access and influence, 
however, creates a conflict between 
the public duty of deciding matters on 
merits and the financial interests of the 
party or candidate, resulting in some 
public officials giving undue weight to 
the interests of their financiers. This is 
corruption through undue influence 
(Lowenstein, 1989, pp.323-29).
That the bargains struck in the sale 
of access and influence are not overt 
or explicit makes little difference to the 
question of corruption through undue 
influence: the structure of incentives 
facing parties and their leaders once a 
contribution is received remains the 
same, with their judgment improperly 
skewed towards the interests of their 
financiers (Beitz, 1984, p.137). With these 
incentives, there is a double injury to the 
democratic process: wealthy donors are 
unfairly privileged, while the interests of 
ordinary citizens become sidelined. Such 
injury highlights how the sale of access 
and influence is not only corrupt because 
it undermines merit-based decision 
making but is also unfair: contributors are 
illegitimately empowered in the political 
process, while others are illegitimately 
disempowered. 
What, then, should be done as a matter 
of regulation? Limits on contributions, of 
course, provide one way forward. There 
are also other measures that could be more 
effective. For example, there could be a 
ban on ministers and parliamentarians 
attending fundraising events, a measure 
that has been adopted by Queensland 
premier Anna Bligh. The sale of access 
and influence can also be tackled through 
greater transparency in relation to lobbying 
(which is what these occasions amount 
to). There should an obligation to publish, 
at regular intervals, specific information 
on the meetings between lobbyists and 
government representatives, including the 
name of the lobbyist/s, dates of contact, 
meeting attendees and a summary of 
issues discussed. This has been the 
recommendation of a New South Wales 
parliamentary committee and the New 
South Wales Independent Commission 
Against Corruption, as well as by various 
British committees on standards in public 
life (New South Wales Legislative Council 
General Purpose Standing Committee, 
p.60; NSW ICAC, p.101; Committee on 
Standards in Public Life, 2000, p.36, 2008, 
p.4; Committee on Standards in Public 
Life, 2000, p.36, 2008, p.4). 
Conclusion
Ewing and Issacharoff have identified 
a (non-exhaustive) list of factors that 
determine the choice of regulatory method 
... the experience of other 
countries can often cast 
light on how the role 
of money in politics is 
variously addressed and 
regulated. 
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in the area of political finance. These 
factors relate to history, geography, class 
structures, constitutional systems, party 
systems, electoral systems and ideological 
traditions (Ewing and Issacharoff, 2006, 
pp.6-7). If we take such complexity 
seriously – and we should – it is obvious 
that questions as to whether any country, 
including New Zealand, should adopt 
particular regulatory measures are only 
properly answered by an in-depth inquiry 
into its specific circumstances and cannot 
(and should not) be read off comparisons 
(including the one essayed in this article). 
We should abandon the misconceived 
notion that there is an international ‘best 
practice’, or that there is a continuum on 
which we can locate regulatory models as 
‘strong’ or ‘weak’. 
To make these points is not, however, 
to advocate a parochial stance closed off to 
overseas example; the experience of other 
countries can often cast light on how 
the role of money in politics is variously 
addressed and regulated. The aim is not to 
deprecate the importance of comparative 
analysis but rather to point to its limits: 
it broadens our horizons by gesturing to 
what is possible, but often says very little 
as to what is desirable. 
1 ‘Associated entities’ of political parties are defined in the 
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, s.287. Essentially the 
terms covers individuals or groups controlled by or operating 
for the benefit of a political party, as well as individual 
members of or those with voting rights in a party.
2 Queensland recently has adopted a similar requirement that 
political parties disclose gifts of $100,000 or more within 
14 days.
3 The Electoral (Finance Reform and Advance Voting) 
Amendment Bill proposes amending this cap to make it 
clear it applies to each foreign donor, not to each particular 
donation.
4 John Rawls has referred to restrictions on contributions as a 
possible means for ensuring fair value of political liberties: 
see Rawls, 1996, pp.357-8 and 2001, p.149.
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